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 The Procrustean Bed of Class Struggle 
 
Edgar Illas 
 
This essay reflects on the old problematic of class struggle and 
historical change. I examine two dilemmas: first, the dilemma 
between the economy and politics, that is, the question of whether the 
mode of production must be considered the final structure of history 
or whether the political has a constituent and ontological role; and, 
second, the space between the problem of capitalism and the problem 
of ontology, or, in other words, the impasse between Marxism and 
deconstruction. I explore the first dilemma in the contested space of 
Althusserianism, specifically in connection to the notions of 
structural causality and aleatory materialism. Revisiting Althusser 
can offer us a fresh insight on the origin of the “political turn” of post-
Marxism and the shift from the teleological notion of history to the 
notion of history as event. A re-examination of Althusser’s points can 
show us that, against what post-Marxism has led us to believe, this 
shift does not necessarily involve a replacement of the economic 
structure for the political event. 
 In reference to the second issue, I argue that epochal change 
must be thought not only as transition between modes of production 
but also through a structure of otherness. My thesis is that class 
struggle cannot explain nor produce the transition to a new mode of 
production unless it involves an unanticipated moment of radical 
difference. Class struggle should not act as a Procrustean bed that 
keeps us from perceiving the unfathomable, almost miraculous 
moment of true historical change. 
 
Althusser’s Dialectical Immanence 
A fertile space to discuss the enigma of historical change in our 
contemporary theoretical scene is the battleground of 
Althusserianism. As is known, Althusser proposed a new reading of 
the base and superstructure paradigm with the notion of “structural 
causality” and the conception of historical conjunctures as a complex 
unities of “relatively autonomous” spheres (over)detemined in the 
last instance by the economy.1 This model aimed to overcome the 
                                                 
 1 Althusser writes in Reading Capital: “[the unity] is constituted by a certain type 
of complexity, the unity of a structured whole containing what can be called levels 
or instances which are distinct and ‘relatively autonomous’, and co-exist within 
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 Hegelian “expressive” conception of historical stages, by which one 
element of the social expressed the essence of the whole. Yet, the 
rejection of Hegel’s philosophy of history entailed one major problem, 
namely that one could no longer explain historical change through 
the teleological unfolding of some essential principle (such as the 
Absolute Spirit). The paradigm of structural causality was very useful 
to understand the synchronic complexity of historical conjunctures 
while refusing the ideologies of economicism and developmentalism. 
But, within this new structuralist paradigm, how should one account 
for the diachronic succession of conjunctures and modes of 
production? In other words, how should one conceive the transition 
from capitalism to communism?2 
This question was one of the key conceptual challenges that 
faced the late Althusser, and post-Althusserianism emerged directly 
from this fundamental problematic. The essential point that defined 
this problematic can be summarized by saying that the Hegelian logic 
of history based on supersession (Aufhebung) was displaced by the 
logic of the event. While the first Althusser had redefined the Marxist 
logic of history through the paradigm of structural causality and 
overdetermination, the late Althusser continued this task by 
articulating what came to be known as the logic of the historical 
event. 
A first step toward the outlining of this new logic can be found 
in his Essays in Self-Criticism. In them, Althusser explains that the 
combination of elements in the structure of a mode of production is 
not merely formal and that, consequently, one cannot deduce or 
predict new modes by simply combining these elements: “and, in 
particular, it is not possible construct in this way, a priori… the 
communist mode of production!” (Althusser 1976, 129). That is to 
say, historical change cannot depend on stipulating new 
combinations of elements, as if human subjects were merely a 
                                                                                                                                                 
this complex structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific 
determinations, fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of the economy” 
(2006, 97). 
 
     2 As Gregory Elliott’s classic study on Althusser (2009) demonstrates, this new 
structuralist Marxism was itself a product of the conjuncture of 1960s France: 
Althusser’s attack on economicism was a response to the doctrines of the French 
Communist Party and also a “left critique” of Stalinism. See also Montag 2003, 
and Lewis 2005a. 
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 function and a support of new structures. Instead, Althusser stresses 
that, for Marxism, the agency of real subjects and their unanticipated 
“encounter” is crucial in the production of new concrete realities. 
The term “aleatory materialism” represents a step further in 
this direction, as it proposes that historical change can come through 
any sort of social event, not necessarily tied to class struggle. “[T]out 
n’est pas dans la vie lutte de classe” (2005b, 191), proclaims 
Althusser in one of his latest texts, titled “Du matérialisme aléatoire.” 
For him, the interstices and margins of society can also be places of 
heterogeneous resistances and struggles. “[A]leatory materialism,” he 
states in his interviews with Fernanda Navarro from 1984-87, “[is] 
required to think the openness of the world towards the event, the as-
yet-unimaginable, and also all living practice, politics included” 
(2006, 264). Therefore, for the late Althusser the ultimate 
consequence of Marx’s structural dialectics is that historical change 
does not follow the teleology of Aufhebung, but takes place in 
unpredicted, fortuitous ways through the emergence of historical 
events and conjunctures. 
While Althusser initiated this investigation, it was only within 
the post-Althusserian context that this problematic was fully 
developed. Now the logic of the event dominates some of the main 
currents of contemporary thinking and has replaced teleology quite 
entirely: from Badiou to Derrida, from Rancière to Hardt and Negri 
or Laclau and Mouffe, the logic of unpredictable event-ness has 
become, despite its many theoretical formulations, the most common 
conception of historical change. This logic has produced a key 
alteration in the way historical time is conceived. Now conjunctures 
are no longer conceived as a moment in a succession of temporal 
periods; rather, they are the consequence of a foundational event. 
Aleatory events occur and simultaneously institute new conjunctures, 
and one cannot be recognized without the other. The teleological 
conception of history as successive periods separated by transitional, 
world-shattering moments is no longer presupposed. Above all, this 
means that one cannot imagine a full transition to a socialist mode of 
production beyond capitalism. 
This new historical logic has given way to a crucial deduction, 
namely that the end of teleology also entails the end of the economic 
last instance. When one assumes that a determining last instance 
exists, one still operates within a teleological framework. After all, the 
“structural causality” determined by the “absent cause” of the 
3
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 economy or the mode of production still constitutes a causality, a 
dialectical formation, or a teleological remnant. We can locate in this 
evolution of post-Althusserianism the core of the so-called political 
turn in contemporary thought, a turn that has left behind the Marxist 
paradigm of the mode of production and has predominantly adopted 
the terms of political ontology (such as power, biopolitics, 
sovereignty, empire, distribution of the sensible, social or police 
order, etc.). 
In principle, the most fruitful consequence of this rejection of 
the Marxist economic matrix as the last ontological form is that it 
opens up spaces for a multiplicity of political struggles and types of 
resistance. On the basis of these new premises, political struggles no 
longer need to be unified by the common cause against capitalism 
and their finality must no longer be the proletarian road to socialism. 
Transformative events can take place in any context, in any 
interstitial sites, at the margins of a system that has no center and no 
order structured by one major “absent cause.” Negri, for instance, 
defines this post-Althusserian framework as “completely open: ‘man,’ 
‘man’ in history, as subject in history--in this opening without finality 
or necessity but simply available to every aleatory occurrence and to 
every event--builds on this basis the appropriate practices” (Negri 
1996, 62). 
To give ontological prevalence to the economic matrix or to the 
realm of the political seems to be a simple matter of choice. However, 
many problems arise as a result of shifting from the Marxist economic 
framework to the new ontology of the political. The renunciation of 
the structuring “last instance” necessarily entails the impossibility of 
knowing whether a given political practice is resisting the capitalist 
system or whether it is secretly obeying its logic. If the realm of the 
political remains an immanent field without its dialectical 
counterpart, namely the “absent,” “transcendental” structure that 
organizes this field, then we run the risk that our transformative 
political practices leave the system intact. The issue of emancipation 
becomes crucial here. Without the reference to an “absent cause” that 
structures the social as a totality, and therefore without the possibility 
of imagining its (to insert Jameson’s key word: utopian) overcoming, 
how can we determine the content of political practices? No universal 
criterion could tell us any more whether the content of a given 
practice is emancipatory or reactionary, whether it is progressive or 
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 conservative: politics becomes an immanent contest of power forces 
and hegemonic operations. 
In fact, the very notion of emancipation no longer makes much 
sense within the paradigm of the political. This is Laclau’s well-known 
deduction in Emancipation(s). Laclau explains how the discourse of 
radical emancipation emerged with the Christian idea of salvation 
and how, in modern times, it was secularized, via Spinoza, by 
Hegelian and Marxist eschatology. He observes that emancipation 
can only be conceived as the radical break from a present situation, 
that is, as the emergence of a new, liberated realm that cannot be in 
any sense connected to the previous state of enslavement. If there was 
any form of continuation between the two states, then no 
emancipation would have occurred: “either emancipation is radical 
and, in that case, it has to be its own ground and confine what it 
excludes to a radical otherness constituted by evil or irrationality; or 
there is a deeper ground which establishes the rational connections 
between the pre-emancipatory order, the new ‘emancipated’ one and 
the transition between both – in which case emancipation cannot be 
considered as a truly radical foundation” (Laclau 1996, 4). 
This deduction challenges the Marxist eschatology in particular. 
Laclau asserts that the revolutionary emancipation from capitalism to 
communism is a logical impossibility: one cannot presuppose, as 
Marxism does, that there can be a transition between modes of 
production and at the same time conceive this transition as 
emancipation: a deeper ground and a radical break are logically 
incompatible. For this reason, one cannot maintain that the 
proletariat is the special actor that will carry out this emancipatory 
transition. For Laclau, emancipation will only be meaningful as a 
political concept if it remains essentially open: if it is open to the 
possibility that any social agent can articulate itself, by means of a 
hegemonic operation, as the carrier of an emancipatory content that 
is not based on a predetermined ground but that emerges as a result 
of its own articulation. This openness points at the same that Negri 
says when he affirms that changing the course of history should be 
“available to every aleatory occurrence and to every event.” Laclau’s 
analogous motto is that “today we are at the end of emancipation and 
at the beginning of freedom” (1996, 18). Indeed, Laclau’s notion of 
freedom aims to be a purer form of emancipation itself: emancipation 
freed--or emancipated!--from eschatology and “deeper grounds” and 
5
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 founded on the very heterogeneous acts that emerge on behalf of 
freedom itself.3  
This embrace of the multiplicity of political practices is highly 
desirable. And the rejection of the proletariat as the primary 
emancipatory agent is certainly necessary, if only because in our 
global times dominated by the logics of immaterial labor, finance 
capital and biopolitical production one can no longer establish clear 
boundaries between workers and capitalists, between work and 
leisure, or between production and life. Thus, one would not have 
anything to oppose to these prospects if it wasn’t because the 
emancipation from eschatology already took place within 
Althusserian Marxism. 
Althusser demonstrated that the structural or materialist 
dialectics are not a teleological eschatology that decides the content of 
emancipatory acts and assumes that transitions from one mode of 
production to another are fully recognizable revolutionary events. 
Indeed, the most perplexing fact is that the non-teleological logic of 
the (political) event was never proved to be incompatible with the last 
instance of the economy. Althusser’s “aleatory materialism” never 
rejects the Marxist primacy of economic form. In “Du matérialisme 
aléatoire,” he does proclaim that the margins can be places of 
resistance not necessarily inscribed to class struggle; but, in the next 
paragraph, he links these margins back to Marx: “Marx wrote: ‘the 
proletariat inhabits the margins of bourgeois society’” (2005b, 191; 
my translation). Or, in his interviews with Fernanda Navarro, he talks 
about the aleatory logic of the event and reinscribes it to class 
struggle: “for a history which is present, which is living, is also open 
to a future that is uncertain, unforeseeable, not yet accomplished, and 
therefore aleatory. Living history obeys only a constant (not a law): 
the constant of class struggle” (2006, 264). 
Class struggle may be a constant, or a “tendential law” (264), 
but it certainly continues to function as the underlying, 
overdetermining economic instance that the post-Althusserian 
“political turn” has rejected. In fact, Althusser’s central project for a 
materialist dialectics precisely demonstrates that the logic of the 
event cannot operate without the last instance. Althusser’s aim is to 
recognize the multiplicity and the “relative autonomy” of conjunctural 
                                                 
     3 For critiques of Laclau’s “anti-essentialist” position, see Dallmayr 1987; 
Shoom 1995; Lewis 2005b. 
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 political, cultural, social, and tactical struggles. But these struggles, in 
their very effectivity, refer to a last instance, even though we know too 
that “the lonely hour of the ‘last instance’ never comes” (Althusser 
2005a, 113). What made possible the reconceptualization of 
historicity as a field of multiple events and emancipatory acts was the 
(economic) structural causality that converts aleatory conjunctures 
and occurrences into meaningful events and, potentially, into 
revolutionary practices. The significance of these events comes from 
the overdetermining instances which produce them but which 
become visible and structured as a result of the emergence of the 
events themselves. And the “last instance” is an essential part of this 
structuring process, as it (over)determines which events will become 
dominant and hegemonic; an overdetermination that remains 
inherent, not external, to the events. The events and the systemic 
structures in effect are ultimately part of the same (dialectical) 
process and they cannot be separated without losing their ontological 
cogency. In this sense, Étienne Balibar explains that the Althusserian 
conjuncture is not a temporal moment of a structure and that the 
structure is not a teleological template: “It is no longer a question of 
viewing the conjuncture as a short moment in the life of the structure 
or a transition between successive stages of the structure, because the 
reality of the structure is nothing but the unpredictable succession of 
conjunctures; conversely, the conjuncture is merely determined as a 
certain disposition of the structure” (Balibar 1996, 115).4 
Thus, the unpredictability without finality of the logic of the 
event does not supersede the causality of the structure; or, in other 
words, the structure is not an eschatology that rejects the radical 
foundation of emancipatory acts. On the contrary, events and 
emancipatory acts are a product of the very reciprocity between 
conjunctures (of events and acts) and systemic structures. This is an 
immanent reciprocity, but this immanence does not entail the 
disappearance of the mode of production as the determinant 
causality. The immanence of the field of politics involves conceiving 
                                                 
     4 In this paper, I go back and forth between Althusser’s early and late texts. 
While Negri speaks of a Kehre between the two periods, one of the premises of 
my reflection is that aleatory materialism was already an implicit element of 
structural causality. Thus, I interpret the Kehre as a re-examination of the same 
problematics rather than as a break in Althusser’s corpus. For a full reflection on 
this matter, see Balibar 1994, and the volume edited by Diefenbach et al., 
Encountering Althusser, especially Part I (3-112). 
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 this field as the mode of presence (or Darstellung) of the structure in 
its effects. Given that post-Althusserianism has tended to deduce 
from this immanence that the primacy of class struggle must be 
abandoned, now it might be time to re-emphasize the minimal 
dialectics of this immanent reciprocity between conjunctures and 
structure. After all, the fact that Althusser retained the words 
“structure” and “effects” reveals that, in him, immanence is haunted 
by its inherent other, namely the dialectics between base and 
superstructure. As Warren Montag argues, Althusser put forth 
immanence but, in certain parts of Reading Capital, he also hesitated 
and “posited a whole or structure that not only exceeds its effects, is 
not exhausted in them, but leads a latent existence beneath or behind 
the manifest content, the truth of which in turn could only be that 
hidden whole that it is the task of interpretation to decipher” (Montag 
1998, 71). 
In hindsight, Althusser’s hesitation is not a sign of 
inconsistency; rather, it offers us a valuable lesson: that, even though 
immanence can help us affirm the diversity of political struggles, the 
dialectics of structural causality compel us to direct these struggles 
against the structure of capitalism. The impossible reconciliation of 
these two stances makes all the more necessary the attempt to 
constantly counterbalance them--a counterbalancing that can be 
conceived as a practice of dialectical immanence. 
To sum up, it is only when we assume the ontological 
supremacy of the political that politics and the economic last instance 
become incompatible with each other. As a result of this 
incompatibility, the economy is no longer the structuring form of the 
social but is turned into one of its ontic spheres, that is, into one of 
the contents that make up the social order. But, from the Marxist-
Althusserian perspective, political events and economic structures are 
part of the same materialist dialectics. Here the economic last 
instance is not the eschatology that imposes a single content on the 
multiplicity of events and practices; instead, it is the necessary 
structural condition for this multiplicity to emerge. The political and 
the economic are incompatible only outside of Marxism. Within the 
Marxist problematic, it is precisely their reciprocity and at the same 
time their irreducibility to each other (conjunctures vis-à-vis 
structures) that make possible the emergence of social antagonisms 
as well as emancipatory acts. 
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 The Ontological Boundaries of Marxism 
Let us now move in another direction to deduce further 
implications from the logic of the event. While this new logic of 
history does not require the abandonment of the Marxist political 
economy (as “the political turn” has solved something that 
Althusserian Marxism had already solved), the logic of the event 
inevitably destabilizes the ontological foundations of Marxism. The 
ultimate consequence of this logic is that the most radical historical 
event, or perhaps the event par excellence, must consist in a change in 
the very structure of history itself. Paradoxically, the new historical 
logic of the event cannot have history as its last ontological horizon. 
The event is unpredictable and simultaneously effective only if it 
propels radical change within and at the same time beyond given 
historical situations. The changing event presupposes an opening to 
an outside of history and ontology altogether; that is, it assumes the 
possibility of a radically different outside. 
Here the Marxist ontology of history encounters something that 
cannot be explained within its premises. One may argue that Marxism 
already theorizes these conditions when it asserts that the changes of 
modes of production cause the emergence of different temporalities 
and new ontologies of the present. But this emergence takes place 
through enigmatic transitions and unpredictable revolutionary 
events, and the structure that makes these events possible must be 
conceived as a structure of otherness. The event is the irreducible 
difference of that which remains structurally unthinkable and non-
historical. The conditions for systemic change entail the opening to 
the possibility of an outside that cannot be reinscribed in any 
temporality or form of Being. 
As we saw, Laclau already warned us against the aporia of 
systemic change, which establishes that the promise of emancipation 
and the dialectics of class struggle are logically incompatible: if 
emancipation is real, then it must involve a foundational act that 
radically breaks from the previous situation; but if the deeper ground 
of class struggle is presupposed, then the emancipatory act can be 
predicted and even provoked by this structure and therefore there is 
no real break, but just a transition of conjunctures. For Laclau, this 
contradiction reveals the deceptive nature of Marxist emancipatory 
promises, and he does not hesitate to throw the communist promise 
out with the bath water of emancipation.  
9
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 His caution regarding facile promises of emancipation is 
important, but this logical refutation has entailed, again, the re-
ontologization of the political. Post-Althusserianism has conceived 
the event in political terms as an unanticipated moment of 
constitution; in other words, the political refers to the new ontological 
primacy of the moment of constitution of any new order or 
conjuncture. And while this change has made political practice 
accessible to any aleatory event, the ontological power given to the 
political has ultimately closed off not only the confrontation with the 
mode of production as structure, but also the possibility of an 
unnamed moment of radical difference, a moment that should not be 
conceived as constituent but as impossible, a moment of potential 
critique rather than actual foundation. In other words, the institution 
of the political as the ontological basis of politics is both a positive 
and a negative thing: it has granted political force to all types of 
collective struggles, but, precisely because of this abstract openness, it 
has cancelled the possibility of antisystemic delineations and 
emancipatory practices. And in Laclau’s case, the premises of radical 
democracy, which do not contemplate the possibility of an impossible 
event, ultimately mesh well with the aims of liberal reform and 
parliamentarism.5 
But after encountering the aporia of emancipation, there is 
another possible way of proceeding that may not require the 
abandonment of the hypothesis of systemic change. And this is where 
we must continue to rebalance the critical power of Marxism with a 
certain Heideggerian-Derridean tradition: the deconstructive 
tradition that thinks through the (non-)possibility of an outside to 
historical being and time. 
This is a move between two irreconcilable modes of thought: 
the orthodox Marxist analysis of the mode of production and the 
deconstruction of ontological closure. A constant counterbalance 
between them can provide us two things: first, the guidance of the 
economic “last instance” to understand the structure of historical 
developments, and, second, the imperative to remain open to the 
radically unexpected, to the ontologically other, and to the 
constitutively impossible. The need to counterbalance these two 
modes of thought perhaps derives from an existing impasse in our 
historical consciousness, an impasse produced by the seeming 
                                                 
     5 For an analysis of the contemporary re-ontologization of leftist politics, see 
Strathausen 2006. 
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 impossibility of conceiving any meaningful distance vis-à-vis the 
instrumental reason and reifying logic of our global system. The 
dynamic articulation of these two lines of thought can be a fruitful 
way of disentangling this impasse. On the one hand, the Marxist 
tradition, guided by the hope to achieve a realm of freedom beyond 
the realm of necessity, compels us to confront capitalism and include 
the economic problematic in our dreams of emancipation. On the 
other hand, the Heideggerian-Derridean tradition helps us question 
in a radical way the metaphysical principles that have prevailed in the 
structuring of our world. This questioning aims to search for the 
disjunctures in the structures, the constitutive impossibilities of the 
domain of the possible, and the inhabitable spaces of the real. 
But the irreconcilable gap between deconstruction and Marxism 
is not a marked difference between the two theoretical practices, but 
rather an internal difference that both unites and separates them in 
their attempt to think the possibility of an alternative space or 
systemic outside. J. Hillis Miller has described magisterially how 
Marx’s analysis of the historical succession of modes of production 
involves a moment of internal disruption that is constitutive of his 
narrative: 
Over and over, at each stage of the universal historical 
progression [Marx] sketches out, he shows (1) that you 
cannot see how to get from one stage to the next, or think 
the transition, though (2) the transition does nevertheless 
occur, by a species of unfathomable or unintelligible leap, 
while nevertheless (3) a leap is not necessary because all 
the later stages were always already there from the 
beginning. These three things are asserted at once in 
undialectizable contradiction. (Hillis Miller 1995, 355) 
This undialectizable contradiction is key to understanding that 
an internal/external moment is always necessary to keep the 
dialectics of class struggle moving. A true radical historical event 
must entail a change in the structure of history itself, even though this 
moment of change was already an undetectable potentiality within 
the established historical system. To explain this impossibility, again, 
change cannot have history and production as the last ontological 
horizon but instead must presuppose a structure of otherness vis-à-
vis the (im)possibility of an outside to history and ontology 
altogether. In this respect, if deconstructive critique matters it is not 
so much because it proposes new conceptualizations of historical 
11
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 change (Derrida’s ethical notions of promise or messianism without 
messianism do not seem to offer any directives for revolutionary 
politics), but because it theorizes a necessary and unfathomable step 
in this process of systemic transformation. 
Do Marx and Engels not articulate the possibility of 
communism as a contradictory, impossible leap too, as we can see 
when they affirm in the Manifesto that all history is “the history of 
class struggles” (Marx and Engels 1998, 34), but that communism will 
be the “forcible overthrow of all existing conditions” (77)? Class 
struggle constitutes a necessary template to understand the 
antagonisms of capitalism, but it also turns into a Procrustean bed 
that prevents the potential emergence of an alternative system 
beyond class antagonisms. In other words, the dialectics of class 
struggle cannot lead us to the emergence of an emancipated realm 
unless they are rebalanced, by means of a non-dialectical move, with 
the thinking of the impossible outside. 
In fact, we can find this constitutive divergence between 
Marxism and deconstruction already in some succinct words that 
Heidegger used to define his thinking vis-à-vis Marx’s. While for 
Marx the point is to change the world rather than interpret it, 
Heidegger adds a fundamental inflection to this axiom when he states 
that, in order to change the world, we must first change our thinking 
of it: “For, meanwhile, it has also been demanded of philosophy that 
it no longer be satisfied with interpreting the world and roving about 
in abstract speculations, but rather that what really matters is 
changing the world practically. But changing the world in the manner 
intended requires beforehand that thinking be changed, just as a 
change of thinking already underlies the demand we have mentioned” 
(Heidegger 1998, 338). 
Thus, the attempt to counterbalance these two different tasks 
must follow a further axiom: our imperative must be to change the 
world and change our understanding of the world at the same time. 
But this critical rebalancing cannot be dialectical nor can it 
presuppose a (non-)relation of otherness between Marxism and 
deconstruction. It must necessarily be an always unresolved 
interchange, with no possibility of conclusion in the form of a 
compromise, a synthesis, or the prevalence of one practice over the 
other.6 As Brett Levinson has rightly observed, “neither 
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 deconstruction nor leftism can activate or say that which lies between 
the two, the site where the one contaminates the other” (Levinson 
2004, 17). Thus, while the differences between these two modes of 
thought make their rebalancing theoretically untenable, this 
interchange may nevertheless be articulated in the analysis of 
singular situations. When globalization is occupying all spaces, 
precluding all emancipations, and breaking down all languages, a 
myriad of singularities are calling for ways to transform the world and 
also transform our understanding of it. 
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     6 We should pursue this exploratory path very cautiously. Above all, we must 
avoid appropriating Heidegger for the Marxist tradition, as previous efforts by 
Herbert Marcuse (2005), Lucien Goldmann (1977) or Christopher Pawling (2010) 
to establish a dialogue between the two modes of thought have collided with the 
intransmissible components of Heideggerian thought. On the other hand, the 
famous debate around Derrida’s Specters of Marx assembled by Michael 
Sprinker (1999) exemplifies the difficulties of articulating this dialogue. 
13
Illas: The Procrustean Bed of Class Struggle
Published by OxyScholar, 2014
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Althusser, Louis. 1976. Essays in Self-Criticism. Trans. Grahame 
Lock. London: NLB. 
---. 2005a. For Marx. Trans. Ben Brewster. London: Verso. 
---. 2005b. “Du matérialisme aléatoire.” Multitudes 21: 179-94. 
---. 2006. Philosophy of the Encounter. Later Writings, 1978-1987. 
Trans. G. M. 
     Goshgarian. Ed. François Matheron and Oliver Corpet. London: 
Verso. 
---. And Étienne Balibar 2006. Reading Capital. Trans. Ben Brewster. 
London: Verso. 
Balibar, Étienne. 1994. “Althusser’s Object.” Trans. Margaret Cohen 
and Bruce Robbins. Social Text 39: 157-88. 
---. 1996. “Structural Causality, Overdetermination, and 
Antagonism.” Postmodern Materialism and the Future of 
Marxist Theory. Essays in the Althusserian Tradition. Trans. 
O. Vasile. Ed. Antonio Callari and David F. Ruccio, 109-19. 
Hanover: Wesleyan UP. 
14
Décalages, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol1/iss3/2
 Dallmayr, Fred. 1987. “Hegemony and Democracy: A Review of 
Laclau and Mouffe.”Philosophy and Social Criticism 13 (3): 
283-96. 
Diefenbach, Katja, Sara R. Farris, Gal Kirn, and Peter D. Thomas, eds. 
Encountering Althusser. Politics and Materialism in 
Contemporary Radical Thought. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 
Print.  
Elliott, Gregory. 2009. Althusser. The Detour of Theory. Chicago: 
Haymarket Books. 
Goldmann, Lucien. 1977. Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New 
Philosophy. Trans. William Q. Boelhower. London: Routledge. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1998. “Kant’s Thesis about Being.” Pathmarks. 
Trans. Ted E. Klein Jr. and W. E. Pohl. Ed. W. McNeill. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 337-63. 
Hillis Miller, J. 1995. Topographies. Stanford: Stanford UP. 
Laclau, Ernesto. 1996. Emancipation(s). London: Verso. 
Levinson, Brett. 2004. Market and Thought. Meditations on the 
Political and the Biopolitical. New York: Fordham UP. 
Lewis, William S. 2005a. Louis Althusser and the Traditions of 
French Marxism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
---. 2005b. “The Under-theorization of Overdetermination in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.” borderlands e-journal 4 
(2). 
Marcuse, Herbert. 2005. Heideggerian Marxism. Ed. Richard Wolin 
and John Abromeit. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1998. The Communist Manifesto. A 
Modern Edition. Introd. Eric Hobsbawm. London: Verso. 
Montag, Warren. 1998. “Althusser’s Nominalism: Structure and 
Singularity (1962-6).”Rethinking Marxism 10 (3): 64-73. 
---. 2003. Louis Althusser. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Negri, Antonio. 1996. “Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of the 
Later Althusser.”Postmodern Materialism and the Future of 
Marxist Theory. Essays in the Althusserian Tradition. Trans. 
O. Vasile. Ed. Antonio Callari and David F. Ruccio. Hanover: 
Wesleyan UP. 51-68. 
Pawling, Christopher. 2010. “Rethinking Heideggerian Marxism.” 
Rethinking Marxism 22 (4): 590-604. 
Shoom, Dan. 1995. “Ridding Class of Meaning: Anti-Essentialism in 
the Works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.” Research 
and Society 8: 14-28. 
15
Illas: The Procrustean Bed of Class Struggle
Published by OxyScholar, 2014
 Sprinker, Michael, ed. 1999. Ghostly Demarcations. A Symposium on 
Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx. London: Verso. 
Strathausen, Carsten. 2006. “A Critique of Neo-Left Ontology. ” 
Postmodern Culture 16 
 
16
Décalages, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol1/iss3/2
